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This essay analyzes Kant’s conception of historiography 
in Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in 
weltbürgerlicher Absicht (henceforth; IAG). In IAG, Kant 
presents history as the necessary progression of the 
human race towards the full development of its 
rationaland moral capacities, in accordance with a hidden 
plan of nature, which can only be realized after the 
establishment of a universal cosmopolitan condition. 
However, because Kant is unclear how moral and 
historical progress is possible, it remains unclear how to 
interpret his arguments and, consequently, how to write a 
history in line with IAG. In this essay, I attempt to answer 
this question by interpreting IAG in line with another 
Kantian text, Was ist Aufklärung? This analysis will not 
only show Kant’s arguments in IAG to be inconsistent, 
but moreover that his proposal for a universal history is of 
unconvincing utility. 
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Kant’s most important contribution to the field of 
historiography is his 1784 essay Idee zu einer 
allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht 
(henceforth; IAG), the only of his writings to deal 
exclusively with history. In the IAG, Kant formulates a 
guiding principle for writing a universal history, 
supported by nine propositions. He views history as the 
necessary progression of the human race towards the full 
development of its rational- and moral capacities, in 
accordance with a hidden plan of nature. This plan can 
only be realized after the establishment of a universal 
cosmopolitan condition, which is the end nature has 
intended for the human race.   
  The IAG has long been dealt a subordinate role 
within Kant’s oeuvre. Yirmiahu Yovel for example has 
claimed the IAG to be in conflict with his critical 
philosophy.1 Recent years have marked an increased 
interest in the IAG, as scholars begin to recognize the 
importance of history within the Kantian system. These 
scholars have likewise attempted to reconcile Kant’s 
writings on history with his critical philosophy.2 Even so, 
there remains considerable contention on Kant’s 
conception of history in the IAG. Much of this ambiguity 
is caused by the fact that Kant leaves it unclear in the 
IAG how he believes historical and, concomitantly, moral 
progress is possible. In his ethical writings Kant views 
rationality and morality as eternal and unchanging, thus 
excluding the possibility of an improvement. However, as 
Pauline Kleingeld has convincingly argued, Kant does 
allow our predispositions for the use of reason improve. 
This model views development as the discovery and 
refinement of these dispositions, and will subsequently be 
called the discovery model of moral and historical 
development. 2   
  Terry Pinkard has pointed out that Kant develops 
a second model of historical- and moral progress in his 
essay Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? 
(henceforth; WIA). In WIA, Kant defines enlightenment 
as the human being’s emancipation from its self-incurred 
immaturity. According to the model Kant develop in this 
text, development is made through adopting the right 
attitude. Consequently, Pinkard calls this the indictment 
model. 3  The question which model of historical 
development informs the IAG is the single most 
important interpretive issue of the IAG. From the 
arguments of the ninth proposition it does not become 
clear how history can help bring about the plan of nature. 
Much of this ambiguity is caused by the fact that it is not 
explicit on which model of historical development these 
arguments are based. If we wish to understand why Kant 
believes we should adopt his idea for a universal history, 
we must first establish which model of development 
informs the arguments of the ninth proposition. More 
importantly, such an understanding is crucial if we wish 
to know what a history in accordance with the IAG would 
look like and, ultimately, to assess the tenability of his 
idea.  
 In this paper I will address these issues. In order 
to do so, I will offer a hermeneutical analysis of the first 
eight propositions in the first section. This analysis will 
show the first eight propositions to form a relatively 
straightforward argument, mostly but not exclusively in 
line with the discovery model. In the subsequent section, 
I will discuss Kant’s essay Was ist Aufklärung, in which 
he develops the indictment model of historical progress. 
In the final section I will analyze the arguments of the 
ninth proposition and ascertain with which model of 
historical development these are most compatible. In 
contrast with the first eight propositions, the arguments of 
the ninth proposition only make sense on the basis of the 
indictment model. Using my interpretation of the 
arguments of the ninth proposition, I will finally be able 
to answer what a history in accordance with Kant’s idea 
would look like. Kant’s idea in the IAG is not only very 
vague in its contents, but moreover that it is of 
unconvincing utility. Consequently, we can only conclude 
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 that the IAG fails to present a viable historiographical 
project. 
I NATURE’S HIDDEN PLAN 
 
The central question of IAG is whether it is reasonable to 
assume a purposiveness in the course of human history. 
Kant believes this is the case and advances the view that 
individuals and the human race as a whole, even when 
pursuing their own ends, knowingly or unknowingly 
work to promote the plan of nature (Naturabsicht). This 
plan of nature is directed at the complete development of 
all human dispositions (Anlagen). The task Kant sets 
himself in IAG is to see whether he can discover this plan 
of nature and, subsequently, to formulate a guiding 
principle for writing a history in accordance with this 
plan.  
  In the remainder of the IAG, Kant forwards nine 
propositions to support his teleological conception of 
history. In the first proposition Kant states that “alle 
Naturanlagen eines Geschöpfes sind bestimmt, sich 
einmal vollständig und zweckmäβig auszuwickeln,“4 for 
else we would have to assume nature to be purposeless. In 
the second proposition Kant states that human beings are 
to develop their dispositions directed at the use of reason 
fully in the species, not in the individual. Because nature 
has limited the lifespan of human beings, the full 
development of these dispositions can only be 
accomplished over the course of many generations. It is 
important to note that the plan of nature operates on the 
level human race as a whole, not that of the of the 
individual. As a result, Kant can allow individuals the 
freedom to work contrary to the plan of nature without 
directly threatening the credibility of his idea.   
  In the third proposition, Kant claims that nature 
has endowed humans with only the bare necessities for 
survival, leaving it up to themselves to improve their 
condition through the use of reason.4 According to Kant, 
nature seems to have been more concerned with man’s 
self-worth than with his wellbeing. Consequently, nature 
has not set the attainment of happiness to be the ultimate 
goal for the human race, “sondern daβ er sich so weit 
hervorarbeite, um sich durch sein Verhalten des Lebens 
und des Wohlbefindens würdig zu machen.“4 To be sure, 
reaching this state will produce the greatest possible 
happiness for human beings. However, considered from 
the plan of nature this happiness is corollary, and not a 
goal in itself.   
  In the fourth proposition Kant claims that the 
mechanism nature employs to effectuate the development 
of human dispositions is their antagonism in society. 
Humans have a tendency to enter into society, as society 
will allows them to further develop their capacities. At 
the same time, humans have the unsocial inclination to 
live according to their own private will. The tension 
between setting goals for oneself and the dependency on 
others to effectuate these goals is what gives rise to what 
Kant calls man’s unsocial sociability (ungesellige 
Geselligkeit). Although the antagonism resulting from 
unsociable sociability gives rise to strife, conflict and 
discord, it also inspires renewed efforts to create a better 
condition and prevent further suffering. Consequently, 
Kant claims that without unsociable sociability, all human 
dispositions would lay eternally dormant.4 Unsociable 
sociability is thus the driving force behind moral and 
historical development.   
 The greatest problem nature has set the humans 
race in reaching the end of nature is the establishment of 
“eine vollkommen gerechte bürgerliche Verfassung […].” 
4 Kant claims establishing such a constitution must also 
be considered the highest goal set by nature, as it is only 
upon completing this task that its other goals for the 
human race can be attained (fifth proposition). In the 
seventh proposition Kant claims that for this problem to 
be solved, it is first necessary for states to enter into 
lawgoverned relations in a federation of peoples 
(Völkerbunde). The external relations between states, 
similar to the unsociable sociability in society, are marked 
by a high degree of antagonism, which manifests itself 
most strongly through warfare. Although the 
manifestations of the antagonism between states again 
appear to be wholly negative, these will nonetheless 
compel nations to abandon their lawless condition and 
enter into a federation of peoples, which can ensure peace 
and security among its members. Kant expresses the hope 
that through the best possible cosmopolitan constitution 
internally and rule of law between states externally, a 
universal cosmopolitan condition will be established 
capable of maintaining itself.4   
  Taken together, the first eight propositions of the 
IAG present a straightforward argument, primarily in line 
with the discovery model of development. Kant believes 
history to display a hidden plan of nature, aimed at the 
full development of the rational dispositions of the human 
race. Although this development starts anew in every 
individual, culture enables people to share their insights 
with other human beings and future generations, allowing 
these to benefit from previous achievements. In this 
process, culture not only allows the development of 
rational capacities to persist over the course of history, 
but culture itself will improve to better facilitate the 
development of rational capacities in the individual and 
the human race. The IAG also concurs with the 
indictment model. Because the development of rational 
dispositions starts anew in every individual and is a free 
choice, this development requires the right attitude. In a 
negative sense, this attitude is shaped in confrontation 
with the suffering resulting from man’s unsociability, 
which inspires people to undertake efforts to improve 
society. Positively speaking this attitude takes shape 
through culture and education on the one hand. 
Eventually, the cultivation of morality will result in the 
establishment of a universal cosmopolitan condition, 
allowing humans to live in conformity with their freedom 
and worth as rational beings. 
II THE QUESTION OF ENLIGHTENMENT  
 
The IAG appeared in the Berliner Monatsschrift of 
November 1784. The Monatsschrift of the following 
month likewise featured an essay by Kant by the title 
Beantwortung der Frage: Wass ist Aufklärung? 
(henceforth; WIA), in which Kant develops the 
indictment model of historical development. In the 
opening lines of his essay, Kant defines enlightenment as 
“der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst 
verschuldeten Unmündigkeit.“5 Kant defines immaturity 
as the inability to make use of one’s reason without the 
direction of others. Kant takes cowardice and laziness to 
be the reasons why people continue to rely on authorities 
instead of thinking for themselves. Therefore, Kant coins 
“Sapere Aude! Habe Muth dich deines eigenes 
Verstandes zu bedienen!“ 5 the motto of the 
Enlightenment.  
  According to Kant, the prospects for a single 
individual of leaving his immature condition and 
enlightening himself are slim. However, he claims it is 
almost inevitable for a public that it should enlighten 
itself. All that is needed is the freedom to make use of 
reason publicly.5 To elaborate his claim, Kant introduces 
a differentiation between the public and the private use of 
reason. Kant defines the public use of reason as that 
which a scholar makes when addressing the reading 
world. This use of reason should always be left 
unrestricted, as it alone can bring about enlightenment. 
The private use of reason on the other hand is that which 
a citizen uses in the civil post or office with which he is 
entrusted. This use of reason can be limited for the sake 
of public order without threatening the advancement of 
enlightenment.5 Kant takes the example of a church 
minister who questions certain religious doctrines. When 
addressing his congregation he makes private use of 
reason, and cannot deviate from church doctrine. 
Conversely, as a scholar addressing the reading world he 
makes public use of his reason, and should be granted 
unrestricted freedom to question these same doctrines.5   
  Just as in the IAG, Kant reflects on his time by 
raising the question whether his age can be considered an 
enlightened age. He believes to have strong indications 
that the obstacles to universal enlightenment are gradually 
being lifted, making his age one of enlightenment. Kant 
concludes by stating that once the power to think freely 
has been developed sufficiently, this will influence the 
disposition of the people and finally the principles of 
government, allowing them to live in accordance with 
their dignity.5   
  It is in the WIA that Kant puts forward what 
Pinkard calls the indictment model of historical 
development. Kant identifies the inability of people to 
think for themselves as the most important impediment to 
development, which results from a lack of courage. The 
advancement of enlightenment thus requires the public to 
adopt the right attitude towards their rational capacities 
and muster the courage to think freely. This free thinking 
is at first restricted to a separate sphere; that of the 
scholarly world. Once people have entered this sphere, 
they can contribute to both their personal enlightenment 
and that of the public. Here we find how the discovery 
model and the indictment model complement each other. 
Entering the scholarly world requires courage and thus 
the right attitude (indictment model). After people have 
entered the scholarly world, they can participate in 
advancing culture through discovering the requirements 
of reason (discovery model). Inversely, culture will allow 
later generations to be instilled with the proper attitude 
(indictment model), helping them to advance culture even 
further (discovery model). 
III THE CONSOLATION OF HISTORY 
  
In the ninth and final proposition of the IAG Kant claims 
that a philosophical attempt to write a universal history in 
accordance with the plan of nature is not only possible, 
but will actually help its realization.4 It is only at this 
point in the IAG that Kant turns his attention specifically 
to historiography. According to Kant, the merit of his 
guiding principle is not merely that it can be used to 
predict future political developments, since one can 
deduce these from history without assuming the course of 
human events to be purposive.4 So what is the merit of 
Kant’s guideline, and how does a history written in 
accordance with it serve to promote the plan of nature?   
  Kant offers two arguments for adopting his 
guiding principle. The first argument is what I call the 
hope argument. Kant claims that adopting his guideline 
will provide a consoling outlook on the course of human 
affairs. Additionally, it will help appreciate the wisdom 
and ingenuity of nature.4 Considered from the discovery 
model, it is rather peculiar for Kant to cite the hope 
argument. After all, showing what we may hope for does 
not necessarily facilitate the discovery of the 
requirements of reason, nor would it automatically help 
us comply to these requirements. However, in light of the 
indictment model we can understand why the hope 
argument is crucial for Kant. We have already established 
that Kant grants people the freedom to work contrary to 
the plan of nature. Even so, in the eighth proposition, 
Kant claims human nature, “selbst in Ansehung der 
allerentfernesten Epoche, die unsere Gattung treffen soll, 
nicht gleichgültig zu sein, wenn sie nur mit Sicherheit 
erwartet werden kann.“4 More than offering a consoling 
outlook, a history in line with IAG can show people what 
they may reasonably hope for in the future. In doing so, 
history will help people overcome their indifference to 
the plan of nature and assume their responsibility in its 
realization.  
  The second argument, which I call the legacy 
argument, has two parts. First of all, Kant claims that the 
way in which history is presently recorded raises the 
question how future generations will reflect on the burden 
of history we will leave them with. According to Kant, 
future generations will only be interested in what 
previous generations have achieved or harmed from a 
cosmopolitan perspective. Secondly, Kant claims such a 
perspective will help direct the actions of heads of states 
and their servants, whom are very much concerned for 
their reputation, to the only means that will ensure they 
will be remembered with reverence.4 Again, we cannot 
adequately understand the twofold legacy argument on 
the basis of the discovery model. We may believe a 
history in accordance with Kant’s guiding principle can 
provide lessons from the past, and thus help inform future 
changes in political constitutions. However, since Kant 
admits one can enjoy these benefits without having to 
assume purposiveness, he cannot make these arguments 
in favor of adopting his idea. To make matters worse, the 
 discovery model cannot meaningfully be applied to the 
second part of the legacy argument at all. However, seen 
from the indictment model, we can understand a history 
in accordance with Kant’s principle can make us aware of 
our part in the course of history and our responsibility 
towards future generations. Just as with the hope 
argument, this awareness will motivate people to assume 
responsibility and thus promote the realization of the plan 
of nature. The same holds true for heads of state. Their 
concern for their legacy will cause them to follow the 
actions that will ensure they are remembered well. The 
historian taking a cosmopolitan perspective will be able 
to identify these actions as those that will help the 
establishment of a universal cosmopolitan condition.   
  We are now ready to turn to the main objective 
of our investigation, and answer what a universal history 
written in line with Kant’s guiding principle would look 
like. We have seen that the argument Kant develops in the 
first eight propositions ties in with both the discovery and 
the indictment model, without this giving rise to serious 
issues. Nonetheless, with the legacy and the hope 
argument Kant cannot have it both ways; if he wishes his 
arguments to be understood unequivocally, he must side 
with one of either model of historical development.  
  At this point Kant runs into serious difficulties. 
We have already established how the hope argument 
claims a universal history will help people assume 
responsibility for the course of history. Even so, by itself 
this argument does not give us much to go by in terms of 
the actual content of such a history. Should a historian 
reveal how traces of enlightenment have been preserved 
over the course of history? Again, since according to 
Kant one does not have to assume purposiveness in 
history in order to do so, he must have a different role in 
mind for his historiography. Moreover, such 
ahistoriography it would follow the discovery model, and 
we have just established that the hope argument is 
incompatible with the discovery model.   
  The legacy argument provides us with more 
clues for the content and form of a history in line with the 
IAG. Central to the first part of the legacy argument is the 
belief that future generations, when studying history, will 
only be interested in what their ancestors have achieved 
or harmed from a cosmopolitan point of view. Thereby, 
Kant seems to argue that a universal history should only 
narrate what is relevant from a cosmopolitan point of 
view. Even so, because Kant takes a dialectical view on 
historical progress, even actions that are seemingly 
detrimental or indifferent to the plan of nature can or 
must be seen as essential to its realization. The problem 
for the historian is how to identify which actions are to be 
included, as potentially any action is relevant from a 
cosmopolitan point of view. And on this point, Kant fails 
to further explicate himself by offering clear epistemic 
criteria or methodological guidelines. The second part of 
the legacy argument also provides the historian with some 
clue, as it points to the ability of directing the actions of 
heads of state to those means that will ensure they will be 
remembered well. Were a historian to put this use central 
in his history, the result could aspire to no more than a 
mirror for princes. However useful this may be in 
promoting the plan of nature, it can hardly be said to yield 
a viable or adequate universal history. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based on our investigation we can only conclude that the 
IAG fails to form a tenable proposal for a universal 
history. This failure can in part be attributed to the 
incompleteness of Kant’s project. Since the ninth 
proposition fails to provide historians with clear 
epistemic principles or methodological guidelines, it 
remains unclear how to write a universal history in 
accordance with Kant’s guideline. In all fairness, Kant is 
modest in his formulations, referring to his idea as a 
preliminary attempt.  
  More detrimental to the tenability of the IAG is 
the inconsistent view Kant takes on the role of 
historiography in realizing the plan of nature. Our 
analysis has shown that the first eight propositions are 
primarily in line with the discovery model, whereas the 
arguments of the ninth proposition can only be 
understood on the basis of the indictment model. 
 Question remains whether the failure of Kant’s 
historiography also discredits the rest of the IAG. 
Considering the coherence of the first eight propositions, 
one may argue Kant would have done better to leave out 
the ninth proposition and the topic of historiography 
altogether. The resulting text would have formed an 
internally consistent elaboration of a teleological 
conception of nature and history. Such a text would have 
gone further in realizing Kant’s ultimate aim with the 
IAG; to have people belief in the possibility of moral 
progress and to encourage them to take their 
responsibility in realizing this progress.  
ROLE OF THE STUDENT  
The research I present here is an abridged version of my 
bachelor thesis in philosophy.  
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